Ethnic group - Wikipedia
But what if you're already in a happy, monogamous relationship with a partner of the same race? I don't believe in telling other people what to. This analysis explores some of the different factors that may affect the number of inter-ethnic relationships, including ethnic group, gender, age. In view of this, we have decided to focus on positive relationships that can occur between individuals of different ethnicities, and some of the benefits of these.
The goal was to "whiten" Brazil through new immigrants and through future miscegenation in which former slaves would disappear by becoming "whiter". Although discussions were situated in a theoretical field, immigrants arrived and colonies were founded through all this period the rule of Pedro IIespecially from on, particularly in the Southeast and Southern Brazil.
These discussions culminated in the Decree insigned by Brazil's first President Deodoro da Fonsecawhich opened the national harbors[ citation needed ] to immigration except for Africans and Asians. This decree remained valid until October 5, when, due to pressures of coffee planters interested in cheap manpower, it was overturned by Law Later immigration, from on, was not so much influenced by that race discussions and Brazil attracted, besides Europeans, more immigrants from LebanonSyria and Japan, for example[ citation needed ].
Oliveira Vianna and the ideology of "Whitening"[ edit ] See also: Racial whitening and Mongrel complex The Brazilian government, as was commonplace at that time, endorsed positions expressed by Brazilian intellectuals.
An example is a text, written by Oliveira Viannathat was issued as introductory material to Census results. Many pages of Vianna's work were dedicated to the discussion of a "pure race" of white Brazilians.
Census analysis - Office for National Statistics
According to the text, written by Oliveira Vianna, the first Portuguese colonists who came to Brazil were part of the blond Germanic nobility that ruled Portugal, while the dark-haired "poor" Portuguese only came to Brazil later, in the 17th and especially the 18th century.
The painting depicts a black grandmother, mulatta mother, white father and their quadroon child, hence three generations of hypergamy through racial whitening. According to Oliveira Vianna, the blond Portuguese of Germanic origin were "restless and migratory", and that's why they emigrated to Brazil. On the other hand, the Portuguese of darker complexions were of Celtic or Iberian origin and came when the Portuguese settlement in Brazil was already well established, because, according to him, "The peninsular brachyoids, of Celtic race, or the dolicoides, of Iberian race, of sedentary habits and peaceful nature, did not have, of course, that mobility nor that bellicosity nor that spirit of adventure and conquest".
The book appeared at a moment when there was a widespread belief among social scientists that some races were superior to other ones, and in the same period when the Nazi Party in Germany was on the rise. Freyre's work was very important to change the mentality, especially of the white Brazilian elite, who considered the Brazilian people as "inferior" because of their African and Amerindian ancestry. In this book, Freyre argued against the idea that Brazil would have an "inferior race" because of the race-mixing.
Then, he pointed the positive elements that permeate the Brazilian cultural formation because of miscegenation especially between Portuguese, Indians and blacks. He blamed part of their failure to organize on the capitalist class, as they separated black and white laborers.
This separation, specifically between Blacks and Whites in America, contributed to racism. Marx attributes capitalism 's contribution to racism through segmented labor markets and a racial inequality of earnings. Weber argued that biological traits could not be the basis for group foundation unless they were conceived as shared characteristics.
It was this shared perception and common customs that create and distinguish one ethnicity from another. This differs from the views of many of his contemporaries who believed that an ethnic group was formed from biological similarities alone apart from social perception of membership in a group. Du Bois[ edit ] W. Du Bois is well known as one of the most influential black scholars and activists of the 20th century.
Du Bois educated himself on his people, and sought academia as a way to enlighten others on the social injustices against his people. Du Bois research "revealed the Negro group as a symptom, not a cause; as a striving, palpitating group, and not an inert, sick body of crime; as a long historic development and not a transient occurrence". He referred to this idea as the Talented Tenth. With gaining popularity, he also preached the belief that for blacks to be free in some places, they must be free everywhere.
After traveling to Africa and Russia, he recanted his original philosophy of integration and acknowledged it as a long term vision. Washington[ edit ] Booker T. Washington was considered one of the most influential black educators of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Born in as a slave in Virginia, Washington came of age as slavery was coming to an end. Just as slavery ended, however, it was replaced by a system of sharecropping in the South that resulted in black indebtedness. With growing discrimination in the South following the end of the Reconstruction era, Washington felt that the key to advancing in America rested with getting an education and improving one's economic well-being, not with political advancement. Of course, this nation-building is today not what we usually think of as nationalism.
Rather, contemporary nationalism connotes particularism, not homogenization; separation, not inclusion. In a sense, this result is the fulfillment of the prophecy, for nationalism as an ideology does not specify which groups are nations, what level of collectivity may deserve the distinction of nation a state society like Spain?
Groups formerly submerged in states and therefore undergoing the previous kind of "nationalization" or from whom scholarly attention may have wandered because of our interest in state-level nationalism have launched their claims to nationhood based on "the right to one's own culture" implicit in all nationalism.
They can and do say, with more or less justification, that their culture was ignored or threatened by state nationalism and that only real nationalism—that is, the nationalism of "real" nations, which often means "ethnic" or "cultural" nationalism—can correct the situation. Under the ideology of "self-determination," nationalist movements representing segments of larger populations, states, and empires could and did press for nation and state status.
Not all nationalism necessarily seeks or results in a national state, and not all nationalist movements represent real, concrete, already-existing nations. Some nationalism sets more modest goals, such as "national" recognition of a region or province and perhaps a certain amount of devolution of power to the regional or provincial level; arguably, early Tamil demands in Sri Lanka and recurrent Kurdish demands in their various host-states take this form. On the other hand, as recent events have reminded us, Yugoslavian nationalism—"Yugoslavism," the nationalism resulting in the formation of the state of that name—did not refer to a homogeneous, self-conscious nation but rather attempted to emphasize and "awaken" in people of various "nations" the kinship and shared identity between a set of related "nations"; the same can be said of Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, or many other nationalisms.
There is theoretically no lower limit to the size of a group which may call itself, and demand recognition as, a nation; there is also no cultural or political "litmus test" which can establish or deny a group's claims to nationhood, no objective standard or definition to apply. That nationalist movements do stake their claims in terms of culture is no great advance in clarity, but it does present an opportunity for anthropologists to bring their concepts and methods to bear on the phenomenon.
Which aspects of culture are central to the nation: The elevation of one or another of these to the status of a national symbol and marker changes the contours of the group which might be claimed a nation. Serbs and Croats speak essentially one language but have distinct religions and histories; are they therefore one nation or two? If a group loses or changes part of its culture, is it thereby less of a nation or a different nation? If so, the Irish, the Ukrainians, and most Native American groups might cease to be nations.
Connor finds, though, that national identity "may survive substantial alterations in language, religion, economic status, or any other tangible manifestation of its culture. Individuals may have, for any number of reasons, never thought of themselves as members of this or that nation, and nationalism may have to provide the cohesion to make of them a nation; Smith writes that to convert "the masses" into a nation "it is first necessary to 'vernacularize' them and thereby bestow a unique identity and destiny upon them"  —give them something to rally around or show them that what they possess already should be rallied around.
Thus, just as culture is problematic from the standpoint of nationalism, so is the group or nation. I said previously that the nation is an organized and mobilized ethnic group, but I must qualify this assertion with Smith's observation that nationalism can be related to ethnic groups in three different ways—as a revitalization or protection of a "well-formed, ancient but 'decayed' ethnie," as an effort of a segment of the community—especially the elite—to motivate a passive or unorganized group, or as a movement in search of a constituency, which "may actually 'invent' an ethnie where none existed.
Without sounding ethnocentric, I would suggest that a high culture is one which is literate, aesthetic, and politically astute. Many groups which would qualify as nations or proto-nations, which most certainly have a culture, lack a high culture, or more precisely a well- and widely-distributed high culture.
Such high culture as exists may be limited to the academics, the intelligentsia, the political leadership—often urban, often Western-educated. The task of nationalism—of mobilizing or assembling the nation—involves in such instances at least the "vernacularization" of the restricted high culture, its digestion and presentation to a mass audience. At most, it may involve the creative elevation or invention of a high culture if none exists: However, in the process of collection, assembly, interpretation, and vernacularization, what is produced is not the same culture as the "peasant" or "rural" or "traditional" culture which was ostensibly "discovered.
Where dominant great traditions exist, either indigenous to the area or borrowed long ago, nationalism will select from but simplify this culture for popular consumption; he cites India and Pakistan as examples.
Where more than one high culture exists but none is dominant, a cultural struggle will accompany the vernacularization process, as in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Finally, where no internationally recognized and esteemed high culture exists or is deeply rooted he uses new African states as an examplesuch a culture must be borrowed or invented, then struggled over and vernacularized.
It is not only high culture but any culture that can be used as a tool and weapon in "ethnic" or "national" struggle. Thomas Hyland Eriksen presents one example of this "invention" of culture in the case of Norway. He reports that in pre-nationalist Norway as late as the mid-nineteenth century a distinct and widespread "national" culture was missing. The main written language was Danish, not Norwegian.
However, "ethnic" or nationalist leaders—principally the urban and middle class—desirous to demonstrate that there was a distinct and ancient Norwegian "nation," went "in search of" authentic Norwegianculture in the rural and peasant sectors of the country.
- Race and ethnicity in Brazil
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- Ethnicity, Culture, and "The Past"
They brought back "folk costumes, painted floral patterns rosemalingtraditional music, and peasant food" which were elevated to the status of national symbols; high culture creators such as the composer Grieg and the author Bjornson incorporated these "folk" elements into their works; furthermore, Norwegian dialects were reformulated into a "new literary language" called New Norwegian.
Never mind that the claim to "authentic Norwegian culture" was dubious on two counts—that these cultural traits were not the heritage of all or even most people in the "nation" and that many of the traits for example, the floral patterns and many of the folk tales and costumes were not indigenous or unique to the "nation" at all but were diffused from other parts of the world or invented outright by the nationalists themselves.
The newly-elevated symbols were offered as "evidence" that "Norwegian culture was distinctive, that Norwegians were 'a people' and that they therefore ought to have their own state,"  but essentially what transpired is that a national culture was invented and with it a nation.
Nevertheless, to a greater or lesser extent it worked: Norway became an independent state ostensibly a nation-state inand the new king interestingly, from a Danish family took a dynastic name—Haakon VII—to claim continuity with Norway's ancient political past.
This practice of legitimating new states and mobilizing or consolidating or inventing nations through invocations of some distant past which is at best of questionable relation to the present people and polity is commonplace in the world of post-colonial states in Africa and Asia. One has only to think of the Gold Coast becoming Ghana or Rhodesia becoming Zimbabwe to see the process in action.
The phenomenon is by no means, though, restricted to non-Western and post-colonial societies but can be and has been identified in Western societies as well for example, Hitler's Germany has been mentioned as a case of manipulating symbols of "traditional" culture and history, from folk music to the dead emperor's remains; the same can also be currently or recently observed in the former Yugoslavia. Questions of authenticity, uniqueness, continuity, and even relevance of the old in relation to the new are secondary to the function of the claims and symbols in the "nation-building" process.
Ethnicity as Past, Present, and Future The popular perception of ethnic groups and nations—a perception which has been raised to the status of theory by some researchers—is that they have long, continuous, often glorious histories of cultural distinctness and often conflict which confer to them the rights of "a people. Even so, virtually all ethnic groups, and virtually all scholarly conceptions of ethnic groups, make some reference to the past. Smith gives six attributes of ethnic groups, two of which are past-related—"a myth of common ancestry" and "shared historical memories"—and Yinger, as I quoted above, sees a notion of "common origin" as characteristic of such groups.
This opinion is nearly universal and quite generally valid. Yet, what does it really mean?
What is the relation between an ethnic group—and especially ethnic conflict—and the past? Like most terms in anthropology and other social sciences, "past" has a large and diverse semantic field, and its connections to the field of ethnicity and ethnic conflict are numerous. It is possible to identify four such connections, which are quite different though related: Most if not all ethnic groups incorporate some alloy of all of these factors, sometimes in such a way that the distinctions between them are disguised or mystified in consequential ways.Did Parents Disapprove? - International Couples
Past as Tradition or "Cultural" Past As cultural past or tradition, the ethnic group defines "what we really are" in terms of "what we were. But for many people in many parts of the world the past is a strong presence.
Thus, the language the group has "always" spoken, the religion it has always followed or that it converted to at some ancient time, the customs, the clothes, the stories and music, the values and morals—these things are effective identifiers and legitimizers of the group.
An ethnic group without a memory of its cultural past and without some continuity with that past into present behavior or identity or ideology is, by definition, virtually unthinkable. I might mention at this point the role which anthropology has played in this process, both as a practice of collecting and preserving what might have been lost in the past without it and as a perspective and discourse which validates and to an extent reifies "the past" or "tradition" as something important, real, and available; anthropology cannot take all of the credit, even among the various fields of scholarship history, linguistics, and philology among others have played major parts, tooand certainly both scholars and lay-members were aware of and concerned with their past and traditions before anthropology came along; still, anthropology has been a powerful engine for research into and conceptions of tradition which, it would be wise to remember, have had ramifications well beyond the academy.
This does not mean, however, that the past "traditional culture" was what culture is today, nor that it was as they remember it in retrospect. Memory is porous and productive, and the past is elusive, especially but not exclusively when the past was a preliterate period.
The porosity of memory allows elements to slip out and to slipin, rendering the firmest memories contestable. Ethnography is replete with accounts of the traditional conditions of various cultures which are questionable at best, absurd at worst: From the point of view of the student who not only aims to piece together the past but to establish its relation to and salience for the present, "retrospective vision, however erroneous, is more important than the myth unknown or forgotten by old informants.
In the most extreme cases, the "tradition" may even be a fabrication, an invention, either from bits and pieces of the past, from disparate local cultures and traditions, or from a stipulation of contemporary culture or social situation as representative of the past. The historical "ethnic" past could be thought of in at least three phases—ancient formative past, colonial past, and recent political past.
Race and ethnicity in Brazil - Wikipedia
Most of the ethnic groups and nations drawing our attention today and involved in the most public conflicts can claim a history of centuries or millennia; the Jews, the Irish, the Sinhalese are but a few examples. In that ancient time a kind of ethnogenesis occurred, due to the invention or adoption of a religion, the development of a civilization or state, a great national struggle, or some such course of events.
This ancient history, interestingly, may be a past of glory and honor or of humiliation and dishonor, or a combination of both, since either can function as a means to define and motivate a group. Particularly common is the reference to a great historical military defeat Catholic Ireland's Battle of the Boyne, Serbia's Battle of Kosovo and the desire for revenge and group redemption which the memory evokes even today, centuries later.
The defeat of Israel and destruction of the Temple were a cause of significant spontaneous hermeneutics and historical exegesis, and for them as for many groups the memory of a lost homeland—lost literally or symbolically—may be the central organizational experience for contemporary ethnicity. Groups will, in fact, go to great lengths to "discover" and systematize a past in which they were either prior to, superior to, or dominant over rival groups, or in which they were damaged or shamed by those groups; both are equally calls to action.
Groups in the process of "nation-building" will often emphasize the compilation of a national history as a national priority; Sri Lanka's rival groups have done so. Russian nationalists, "awakened" by Peter the Great's contact with and adoption of Western European cultures, "discovered" an ancient past for the nation in the document known as the Book of Vlas, allegedly a chronicle of the earliest rulers of Russia some three thousand years ago.
The book claims glorious interestingly, Aryan ancestry for the Russian people—the frequency of claims to "Aryan" ancestry and identity in the realm of ethnicity and nationalism being truly astonishing—and priority among the peoples and cultures of Europe. Perhaps most importantly it establishes a European and not an Asiatic heritage for Russia, which was an important issue of the day.
The orders to compile and copy the records and documents came from Peter himself, suggesting their significance to the nation-building endeavor. It is worth noting in passing that, as in the case of Norway above, Russian nationalists also looked to the village and peasant culture for the " artifacts, values, and symbols of the nation.
Consequentially, anthropological studies can be implicated in this nationalistic historical struggle in a number of ways. Ethnography can be appropriated as an authentic or problematic record of culture, and for many groups—like many Native American groups—it is the only written record of a now-defunct culture as a result of the well-known "salvage anthropology".
Linguistic anthropology can serve as a means to establish antiquity for a language group or to link it to some glorious language or language family again, often the "Aryan" or "Indo-European" family. Even in the early s it could be observed that governments were increasingly investing in archaeological research to confirm or invent historical bases for their nationhood or statehood, like the excavation of Great Zimbabwe which led to the reactivation of the name by a modern African state.
In Sri Lanka, history in general and archaeology in particular have been contentious fields for politics and culture, so much so that the government would only sponsor research on Buddhist Sinhalese sites and ethnic extremists have been known to attack and damage sites which support the claims of their rivals. After the ancient past, the most critical historical age for many groups is the period of European colonialism. This is a familiar point. A variety of fundamental social and cultural changes to non-Western "traditional" societies followed from colonialism, not the least of which was prolonged contact with a radically foreign culture.
The very fact of conquest, occupation, and an end to relative cultural isolation, let alone the contents of the intruding culture, could initiate a sort of cultural reflection, a "spontaneous hermeneutics," on culture, identity, and difference.
However, certain specific activities and policies of colonial powers had distinct and profound consequences for subsequent ethnicity, nationalism, and conflict. For one, colonial political boundaries were drawn, as is well known, with little or no regard for sociocultural boundaries; of course, in this pre-anthropological time little was known, and little was cared, about local sociocultural boundaries, and it has been argued that those boundaries were in actuality so vague and porous if they were "physical" or territorial at all —groups being much more mixed and permeable than we often allow and often not territorially structured—that any political borders would have done some injustice.
However, this is precisely the point: In some cases, groups which had previously had little contact with each other or which had a history of hostility were thrust into the same colony, while other groups with more or less ethnic or national consciousness were divided across two or more colonies. Thus, "plural" societies were created in a way which may not have existed before.
Certainly, "plural" societies, after a fashion, existed in pre-colonial times; Colin Turnbull's study of the Mbuti "pygmies" and the "Negroes" describes another such "society," within which the two groups are so intertwined that it is difficult to place specific boundaries, territorially or culturally, on them.
However, in many places, even groups in geographic proximity for instance, hill people and valley people may have lived rather autonomously. Only the arrival of colonialism, and with it the effort toward uniform law and administration, brought them into real and sustained social proximity. Again often for administrative purposes, but also out of genuine conviction, groups were taken to be real, exclusive, and well-bounded—that is, to be self-contained "societies.
At the very least, groups which were not utterly socially discrete were treated as so, administratively and anthropologically. In other cases, groups which were not societies or cultures at all, but some other type of collectivity like a class or a caste or a dominant or royal lineage, were construed as separate "societies" or "tribes" or "nations" or "ethnic groups. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, "caste" distinctions cause heterogeneity within "ethnic" groups yet demonstrate how, even in traditional pre-colonial society, a process of incorporation could transform "ethnic" groups into "castes" and vice versa.
In many instances, racial categories were superimposed upon existing social differences, reifying those differences while often suggesting a closer racial relationship of one group than the other to the white colonizers. The very idea of "race" was and to an extent is a European or Western preoccupation, not endemic to all societies or civilizations—not only as a method to classify peoples but also to explain behavioral differences in terms of physical differences.
Like the notion of "society," "race" too was supposedly a real, discrete, bounded phenomenon with a discernible set of traits, this time physical rather than cultural; yet, the two concepts worked hand in hand, since a set of cultural traits could ideally be attributed to the group identified by its set of physical traits. Race was often linked to or established on the basis of "cultural" characteristics, most particularly language or territory: Not only that, but by definition at least by Western definition races—unlike societies—are hierarchically related.
Race labels communicate the message not only that "we are different from you" but that "we are better than you. In Rwanda and Burundi again, the ascription of Tutsi as a "race," as a "noble race," as a "Hamitic Biblical race," draws the association between them and their former European colonizers. Having established discrete administrative units, ostensibly on the basis of pre-existent social or racial distinctions, colonialists also sought rulers or representatives from the local groups, with various cultural consequences.
Some groups, such as Australian Aboriginals or some Plains societies of Native Americans, had no "leaders" or political integration of the sort adequate to Western administration. Groups which did have leaders often suffered the co-optation of those leaders by the colonial government, shifting the balance of power in the group in ways which may have been inconceivable before; Catharine Newbury, for instance, describes the intensification of control and exploitation by Rwandan basically Tutsi office-holders chiefs and patrons after colonialism began.
The social and political implications are obvious: Often, this imposition of foreign power had one or both of two other effects. The results were again animosity and rivalry between these advantaged minorities and the other groups in the society. The other effect was the actual creation of a new advantaged class, an elite class availing itself of the opportunities which education, economy, and politics for example, the civil service presented; interestingly, this elite class, which figures prominently in almost every instance of ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic conflict—as the sort of "vanguard" movement of the group—often starts out as inter-ethnic or "non-ethnic," in the sense that it includes members of many or all "ethnic" groups and eschews an "ethnic" ideology in favor of a modernizing, often West-leaning, liberal, and "nation-building" philosophy.
It is often this group which takes the reins of power upon independence from colonialism as the best prepared to manage a modern Western-style democracy. Yet, paradoxically, efforts toward some degree of democracy—either in the late stages of colonialism or with independence—have often if not usually had the effect of intensifying group competition and identification; under the practice of "communal representation," which was viewed in some colonies at some times as the best way to represent all the people and to balance the interests of the constituent groups, group differences were reified, institutionalized, and politicized in unprecedented ways to assure groups a share of power as groups.