Autobiography of Carl Stumpf First published in Murchison, Carl
Thu, Jun 9th pm. Gleason's Gymnastics' Niagara Frontier level five team recently participated in the Stumpf's Anniversary Meet in Williamsville. *If you still owe for States this meet fee was applied to your state meet fee. LEVEL 3, 4. STUMPFS ANNIVERSARY MEET. MAY 13TH. Wehrle Dr. At Bamberg we had a complete orchestra which met regularly at the At the anniversary of the University of Berlin in the title of Doctor honoris was.
Rollinger, The second metaphysical topic to which Stumpf attaches great importance in his writings is that of psychophysical relations. Unlike most of his contemporaries, including Brentano and Husserl, Stumpf unequivocally rejects the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism according to which the physical and the psychological are aspects of one and the same reality and advocates, following Lotze, a form of interactionism that rejects monism in favour of dualism.
The discredited dualism however, according to which everything in the world, including the mental and physical, stands in thoroughgoing interaction directly or indirectlynow appears as the true monism. According to interactionism, the world, despite the diversity of its parts, is a unified organic whole.
Thus the parallelistic view proves to be impractical and contradictory, and the theory of interaction therefore remains, for the time being, the best guide through the maze of this great problem. Martinelli, Despite his critique of psychophysical parallelism, Stumpf advocates, like Spinoza, a form of pantheism that is consistent with his deterministic and mechanical conception of nature.
However, as Stumpf pointed out in Erkenntnislehre —, p. The habilitation thesis of Stumpf focuses on the nature and origins of mathematical principles or axioms. Its starting point is articulated by the following question: Is there knowledge of scientific importance, which is in no way based immediately nor mediately on experience; and if there is such knowledge, what is its source? Stumpf,Bogen 1—1 The habilitation thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, Stumpf examines two antagonistic positions which prevailed at the time, namely J.
Stumpf rejects both accounts and seeks to show, in the second part of his thesis, that axioms and mathematical propositions are analytic a priori; they are not acquired through experience but are the result of a process of deduction from concepts.
In the critical part of his work, Stumpf poses the problem of the origins of the laws and principles of logic and mathematics as follows: Against Mill, Stumpf argues that the axioms are not the result of empirical generalization based on an inductive process, and that arithmetic, like geometry, is a deductive science based on a priori and necessary truths, which are justified by the evidence of internal perception.
Stumpf,Bogen 5—4 Stumpf therefore agrees with Kant that axioms are necessary truths, but he denies that they are based on synthetic a priori judgments. Stumpf criticizes Kant especially for the thesis according to which the origins of the necessity of our knowledge of axioms lie in intuition, in that knowledge of mathematics then becomes dependent upon experience.
However, Stumpf argues that intuition understood in the Kantian sense is inductive and only leads to concepts and never to propositions. That is why Stumpf claims that the very idea of synthetic a priori judgments is a contradiction in terms. Axioms and propositions are analytic judgments constructed deductively from concepts.
In his habilitation thesis, Stumpf is more concerned with delimiting the field of logic and mathematics from that of psychology. In this regard, Stumpf clearly separate the question of the origins of concepts, which is a psychological question, from the logico-mathematical domain to which propositions and axioms belong. For, as Stumpf argues in his posthumous work, one can agree with empiricism on the psychological origin of concepts while acknowledging that there is a priori knowledge which is independent of experience.
In his Raumbuch, published three years after his habilitation thesis, Stumpf attempts to demonstrate the thesis that the concept of space has psychological origins. However, the position one takes on this issue is distinct from that which one adopts regarding the nature of propositions and necessary truths in the logico-mathematical domain.
For, in this domain, one is solely concerned with axioms and propositions, which can be deductively inferred, and one also assumes the origins of the axioms and their justification as necessary truths.
Stumpf argued in that these axioms are analytic a priori propositions and that arithmetic and geometry are deductive sciences. There is a remarkable continuity in the work of Stumpf regarding his positions from his habilitation thesis up to his posthumous work, not only on the question of the foundation of mathematics but also on the matter of the theory of knowledge.
One of the main theses he advocates in Erkenntnislehre is based on the distinction between the origins of concepts and the origins of knowledge. Ewen,p f. This question was left open in our early remarks because the classification criteria used were based on the cardinal distinction between phenomena and psychical functions, which underlies the main division between natural and social sciences.
This is why one must rely on a new criterion based on the distinction between a priori and a posteriori methods in order to delineate mathematics, including geometry, from the other sciences. The most tangible characteristic that is offered to us to delineate the mathematical sciences from all other sciences is that of the differences in method, i. Despite the opposing effort to assimilate mathematics to the natural sciences, this distinction persists, and in my opinion, rightly so. The attempt made by J.
Mill to inductively derive the principles of mathematics and logic from a collection of several individual experiences manifestly runs in circles. The position he advocates in is therefore not different from the one he advocated thirty-five years earlier in his habilitation thesis. We have seen that Stumpf associates it with both the neutral sciences and the question of the foundation of knowledge, specifically with the ultimate justification of knowledge.
Inquiry on the origins of concepts, as we said, is a task specific to psychology. Yet, these axioms are nothing but propositions that we assume to be true and necessary, and they have their origin in the content of a specific class of psychical functions, namely judgments. Since the contents of judgments are formations or products Gebilde which, as we said, belong to eidology, the field of research of the theory of knowledge is therefore linked to that of this neutral science which also includes states of affairs, as we shall later examine.
One must therefore avoid confusing the question of the nature of axioms with that of the psychological origins of concepts, but one can no more entirely separate the theory of knowledge from descriptive psychology since axioms are originally the contents of a specific class of psychical functions, i. Stumpf opposes two schools of thought on the question of the relationship between the theory of knowledge and psychology: The position adopted by Stumpf in this debate consists in conceding to criticism that necessary truths are irreducible to facts while admitting, with psychologists, that psychology is essential to the theory of knowledge.
Hence the main mistake he attributes to Kantianism, which consists in refusing the assistance of psychological research with respect to the theory of knowledge. However, this critique of the Kantian theory of knowledge does not make Stumpf an advocate of psychologism. For Stumpf acknowledges with critical philosophy that we must maintain a strict concept of necessity and thus oppose the reduction of the principles and laws of logic and of science in general to simple empirical generalizations.
Stumpf here refers explicitly to J. Fisette, a That said, there are many parallels that can be drawn between the positions of Stumpf and of Frege on the foundations of mathematics and on psychologism. Although it can be assumed that the two philosophers met during this period, we have no written evidence that confirms this.
Nevertheless, the correspondence that Frege and Stumpf exchanged in the early s seems to confirm that the two philosophers knew each other. In any case, an explanation of the elective affinities between Stumpf and Frege might be found in the work of Lotze.
Logic, Language, and States of Affairs Stumpf did not publish any specific work on the topic of logic and wrote only a few pieces on language. These are however two topics in which Stumpf was very much interested.
As to the topic of logic, there are many syllabi and extensive lecture notes, including those written by Husserl during his studies in Halle, which again show a direct influence from Brentano K. Schuhmann,; R. More precisely his contribution to logic in these two research areas concerns in fact the specific content of judgment belief or what he calls states of affairs, and that part of the theory of relations pertaining to part-whole relations.
The first leads to a theory of the states of affairs while the second was useful in developing a formal ontology, one that was central in the logic of his student Husserl.
He claimed that the application of probability concepts does not involve any presuppositions about the external world and the law of causality, for the calculus of probability is purely a priori and is solely derived from the concept of probability itself.
The meaning of a sentence corresponds to the content of a function, distinct from the quality and matter of a predicative judgment. The matter Materie of a judgment, which is provided by the lower level act of presentation, is what remains when one disregards the affirmation and negation, i.
In addition to its quality and matter, a judgment has a content and a state of affairs, the latter roughly corresponding to what we call a proposition. The truth of a statement is defined as the correspondence of the judgment quality to its content, that is, the property of a judicative content by virtue of which acceptance or its opposite, rejection is prompted by purely objective motives.
This concept of truth is grounded in the evidence of internal perception is true what is mediately or immediately self-evidentwhich also plays a central role in his theory of knowledge. The study of the structures of the contents of judgment as such, apart from its functions and contingent states, is one of the tasks Stumpf assigns to this part of eidology which he calls the theory of states of affairs.
Chrudzimski, One of the original contributions of Stumpf to logic rests on the notion of state of affairs, which was already used in the history of philosophy and especially by Lotze. InStumpf associates it with the concept of formation or product Gebilde and applies it to both intellectual and emotional functions, where in the latter case it is conceived as a value also called Wertverhalt on which ethics and practical philosophy in general are based.
It can only be real as the content of a judgment that is actually taking place. States of affairs are, as any other formation, governed by general and necessary laws, and are independent of the individual and the contingent act of judging.
These structural laws or axioms as he calls them in his Erkenntnislehre govern relations between elementary psychical formations. Stumpf distinguishes between formal axioms, which apply to any objects, and material or regional axioms that apply to specific domains of objects, such as in the domain of phenomenology structural relations between phenomena and that of psychology structural relations between elementary psychical functions.
Of particular interest to logic are the axioms of consequence Folgerungsaxiomeexpressing themselves in propositions that posit a relation between the premises and the conclusion in terms of necessary inference.
It will be recalled that values are specific contents of acts belonging to the class of emotional functions or feelings and that they resemble the contents of judgment that belong to the class of intellectual functions. Ethics, like aesthetics, is grounded entirely on the class of feelings.
Values or value-feelings, which are essential for an ethics worthy of this name, refer to the specific contents of will or voluntary actions.
Moral actions, as opposed to instinctive or mechanical behavior, presuppose knowledge since this class of acts is grounded on judgments that in turn are at the foundation of theoretical knowledge. Just as true judgment, moral behavior differs from blind actions by the insight or self-evidence that is to the content of a feeling value what theoretical self-evidence is to a state of affairs. And just as the truth in logic, goodness or what is worthy of being wanted or desired is based on intrinsic and objective values that are immune to any external forces.
Pompino-Marschall,those on ethnomusicology cf. Lampert,we also owe to Stumpf several studies on the history of music. Stumpf,In his autobiography, Stumpf listed his work in this field and stressed the importance of his contribution in two of his works: To the systematic science of music belong, besides my works on physical and psychological acoustics, especially the treatise, Psychology of Music in England, and the book about the beginnings of music. In the treatise, which is an introduction to the later works on Tonpsychologie, I discussed the relation of music to language, and that of human speech to the utterances of animals — with reference to Spencer and Darwin — but also the exaggerated nativism of Gurney power of soundwho practically ignored all genetic explanations and focused only on the erotic feelings of animal ancestors.
Three theories on the origin of music are discussed, namely that of Darwin, that advocated independently by Rousseau, Herder, and Spencer, and finally that of Wallaschek and K. Sommer and Willam A. This issue led to a long discussion in his correspondence with Brentano on whether pleasure, and aesthetic pleasure procured by a work of art, is intentional or phenomenal in nature.
Every work of art bears within itself its primary purpose [which consists] in the production of an aesthetic enjoyment. And here, in this immediate effect, lies the enigma. Stumpf acknowledges that sensations can act aesthetically on a subject without any conceptual thought or representation.
Hence the dual origin or source of aesthetic experience: Stumpf,p 8;p 54 The first source is phenomenological and resides in the formal relations which are given directly to consciousness.
The second source is more complex in that it presupposes the processing of the phenomena and sensory data through judgment. The works and teachings of Stumpf in the field of emotions have had some influence on the literary work of the young Robert Musil.
We know that Musil went to Berlin in to undertake his studies in philosophy, physics and mathematics. Inhe successfully defended, under the direction of Stumpf, a doctoral thesis on the work of Ernst Mach R. Oesterreich who wrote his doctoral dissertation in under the supervision of Stumpf. It is more than likely that Musil attended these lectures. Baumgartner,Herbart M. Kaiser-El-Safti, ; S.
Poggi,Helmholtz H. Reinecke, Wundt U.
Wolfradt,or to H. The most important contribution of Stumpf in the field of psychology — understood in the narrow sense of the science of psychical functions — is his Psychology of Sound published in two volumes. Stumpf,The first volume deals with individual sound judgments while the second, dedicated to Brentano, studies the consciousness of simultaneous sounds. The third was to focus on musical phenomena such as consonance, dissonance, accords, melodies, etc.
This complex and unfinished work attracted much interest at the time and was reviewed by philosophers such as Meinong and Natorp and by psychologists such as J. Ebbinghaus, and especially W. Stumpf claims moreover that there are sensory contents which are not related to judgments or any other mental functions such as space as he had demonstrated in his Raumbuch. Ierna, In the field of psychology, Stumpf is also known for accounting for the famous case of Clever Hans, which aroused great interest in the early twentieth century, and which represented a significant step in the development of experimental psychology.
Pfungst devoted an entire book to the case of Clever Hans in which he presented the results of the investigation that he and Stumpf conducted. Stumpf was also interested in other similar phenomena, such as the study of child prodigies like Pepito Arriola and many others. He founded in the Society for Child Psychology and contributed two studies on the topic Stumpf, Fisette a At the very end of his autobiography, Stumpf confesses that he never sought to establish a school and that he is grateful to those of his students who pursued their research based on their own plans in the same scientific spirit.
If indeed he did not establish a school, he is however responsible for the formation of outstanding researchers and philosophers, and he has contributed directly to the development of two of the most important movements in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century: Gestalt psychology and phenomenology. But Stumpf also counts as one of the most stern critics of these two movements as evidenced in his Erkenntnislehre, a posthumous work in which he presents the essential elements of his Weltanschauung and, in a sense, his philosophical testament.
Let us remember that this book is dedicated to Brentano and can therefore be considered a contribution, the last in importance in the school of Brentano, to the philosophical program of his mentor. It is not surprising therefore that the criticism he addressed to his own students in this work was mainly motivated by this program.
In this work, he offers a remarkably penetrating analysis of the philosophical project that guided Husserl in the first book of Ideas. The version created by M. To the following "self-presentation" -- the length of which I beg to excuse in view of the length of my scientific service -- I consented only after some hesitation, when I realized on various occasions how difficult it was even for my scientific colleagues and pupils to find the thread unifying my much-ramified writings and to discover the roots of my scientific life-work.
I hope this may be facilitated by the following. Three brothers have been, and three sisters still are, my tried and true companions in joy and in sorrow. My parents, whose life and care were entirely devoted to the welfare of their children, were still living when I was called to Munich.
My grandfather, Andreas Sebastian Stumpf, who died long before my birth, was a well-known Barvarian historian and a member of several academies. My father's two brothers also were active in science, and published works on statistics, biography, and forestry. My grandfather Adelmann, born inCourt Physician in Gerolzhofen, had studied the French literature of the eighteenth century, as well as Kant and Schelling, whose works, with abstracts and notes, were found in his library.
After his retirement, he came to live with us and taught me the fundamentals of Latin, and later on followed my progress with interest almost to the university.
Thus it may be that the love of medicine and natural science was in my blood. Both of my parents [p. From them I inherited my love of music. After a year in the Latin school at Kitzingen, I attended the "gymnasium" in Bamburg fromand the two following years at Aschaffenburg, where my father was transferred. This charming town became our second home. As I was physically frail, but mentally intense and ambitious, religious, and over-conscientious, my mind developed faster than was really good for my nerves.
But fortunately I could spend the first ten years of my life in the country, where not only a spacious yard, but also some farm-work stimulated physical activity.
Other physical exercise also had an invigorating effect, such as gymnastics, swimming, and especially hiking with my brothers and sisters through beautiful Franconia, later from Aschaffenburg through the Rhineland and the mountains of central Germany, and still later through the length and breadth of the Tyrol and Switzerland. Walking and mountain-climbing in pleasant company seemed to me one of the most important aims of human existence -- liberating and broadening the spirit -- and the school semester, by contrast, a sort of purgatory preliminary to the heaven of vacation.
Many young people in southern Germany probably feel much the same way. This passion for hiking has stayed with me even to my old age, and undoubtedly has helped me to attain the latter.
I do not remember the studies at the "gymnasium" with much pleasure, generally speaking. I made good progress, but only with considerable effort, as I was a year ahead of my age and did not have a good memory for history and geography.
Of my teachers, I hold only two in grateful memory, especially the aged Hocheder in Aschaffenburg, senior professor of the graduating class, who was, incidentally, an impassioned astronomer, and through our study of the Phaedon first awakened my love of philosophy and of the divine Plato.
I have ever remained, at heart, a disciple of Plato.
The instruction in general was anything but inspiring, and even technically unsatisfactory. Mathematics especially was very poorly taught. I had no special talent in that line, but with a sound foundation in school I should probably have made greater progress in it.
There was, however, in the higher institutions of Franconia an excellent opportunity for musical education. Even in Kitzingen [p. At Bamberg we had a complete orchestra which met regularly at the free-standing Aula-building for practice under the direction of the excellent conductor Dietz. One could learn to play any instrument, free of charge. At the age of seven, I had commenced to study the violin, and during my student years had several opportunities to play in public.
Besides this, I had learned without instruction to play five other instruments with more or less success. When we played or sang together at home, the leadership was left to me, and I formed the habit of hearing music analytically, i. Quite objectively speaking, I cannot understand how, without this ability, one can really appreciate in polyphonic music the beauty of the pattern, the weaving in and out of the individual voices, composition in the true sense.
The copying of notes, which for reasons of economy I practiced assidiously [sic], also aided me to gain an insight into the trade secrets of music, as it served Rousseau in a similar manner.
In my tenth year I began to compose my very first work was an oratorio, "The Walk to Emmaus," for three male voicesand during the last years of my course this developed into a dominating passion while I was studying the theory of harmony and counterpoint in the manuals of Silcher, Lobe, and Gottfried Weber.
I composed quartets for strings and other pieces, but unfortunately inspiration did not always keep step with labored reflection. Thus, at the age of seventeen, I entered the university with more love of music than of erudition.
The course on aesthetics by Professor Urlich, the philologist, stimulated me to study the Kritik der Urteilskraft from my grandfather's library. Thus Kant became another of my guiding lights in philosophy. During the second semester I decided to study jurisprudence, not from inclination, but in order to have a profession that would leave me some leisure for music.
I diligently attended lectures on institutions and pandects, on the history of Roman and German law. But towards the end of this semester came the great change, by the addition of Franz Brentano to the faculty. Elsewhere I have already described the complete change which this man's appearance, [p. Everything else vanished before the great problems of philosophical and religious regeneration. Keen thinking had scarcely been in my line so far, and was rather irksome. Only through Brentano's iron discipline the craving for logical clearness and consistency became second nature.
Lauren Kubiak, Stumpfs Gymnastic Center - caztuning.info
All emotional life had to submit now to the laws of reason. This was not to cripple it, but rather to direct it exclusively towards those aims that to us seemed the highest. I was ready to relinquish all worldly happiness for the realization of the ethical-religious ideas of Christianity in my fellow creatures and within myself. This was my condition of mind for four years.
Besides Brentano's lectures, I also took courses in natural science, as he considered both the substance and the methods of science important for philosophy.
His dissertation, wherein he presented the thesis that the true philosophical method is none other than that for natural science, was and has ever remained a lodestar to me. In order to attain some practical knowledge along this line, I worked in the chemical laboratory, though with the final result that by some careless reaction I caused a small conflagration which might have spread over the whole building if the attendant had not come to the rescue.Female warriors on the frontlines
I never attained manual cleverness. How Lotze became my fatherly friend I have likewise mentioned elsewhere. His mental attitude had greater influence on me than Brentano really wished, although the fundamental epistemological lines were always those that Brentano had impressed upon my mind. Besides Lotze's lectures, I also took those of the physiologist, Wilhelm Weber. The latter, besides Brentano and Lotze, developed and formed my manner of scientific thinking. The modest old man, whose whole appearance in the lecture-room seemed at first awkward, even comical, had developed by the most intense mental effort a system of physics, which, better than any logical lecture, revealed to the student the methodology of inductive thinking.
His course, which ran through two semesters, I took down in shorthand almost word for word. Ever since, physics has seemed to me the ideal inductive science.
Friedrich Kohlrausch's research course introduced me to the technique of investigation. Today such preparation, at least for the psychologist, is a matter of course; but at that time a philosopher [p.
My thesis I wrote with a special view to its logical form, and this may have been why Lotze, who at first maintained a skeptical attitude towards my subject and advised against it, in the end changed his mind. The procedure, which I had derived from Brentano, and indirectly from Aristotle, namely, to prepare for the final argument by a complete disjunction of possible opinions and a refutation of all but one, is found in many of my later writings.
In preparation for the final examination, I read all the great philosophical classics, howbeit in a very cursory manner, and for my dissertation, the entire Platonic literature. Brentano's oral instruction and writings had naturally given me a pretty thorough grounding in Aristotle's teachings. How seriously the theory of ideas, which gave even Aristotle some troubles and which -- mutatis mutandis -- is repeated in modern German idealism, must have tormented me is shown by the cry of despair in my first disputation thesis, "Ideae nomen e metaphysica expellendum esse censeo.
Sind wir noch Idealisten? The theological lectures gave me no pleasure, except those of the genial old commentator Schegg, who had traveled through the Holy Land and could describe it most vividly. Besides, I studied most diligently Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics; and Hebrew, on account of the Bible. The fact that I now know only the first letter of the alphabet of this language is a striking example of the effect of disuse on memory.
Within the walls of the seminary, however, even in the spring ofthe second, still more fundamental regeneration overtook me, and again under Brentano's influence.
The whole structure of the Catholic-Christian dogmatic theology and Weltanschauung crumbled to dust before my eyes. In terrible agony of soul I had [p. In July, I took off the black robe. I had not been ordained as yet, so there were no serious complications.
But I had to find my way back to the world, and many favorable, as well as unfavorable, after-effects of this year I was to feel for a long time to come.
Upon my entrance to the seminary, Lotze had written me a letter from which I have quoted his religious views in another article, the end of which, however, I shall add here: I am far from satisfied with the condition of the Protestant church and theology, and will let your criticisms pass, through I do not approve of them all.
I suspect that you do not sanction everything that your church brings forth nowadays its infallibility. The principle itself I cannot discuss with you, since I as well as you believe that the living faith is the only foundation for it. Your decision to become a priest I can accept only with deep respect for your conscientious conviction, and, although it destroys a cherished hope of mine, still I realize the full extent of the blessing that your strong spirit may carry with it in your calling; I realize this too well to think of opposing your decision in any way.
Nevertheless, forgive me, who loves you so dearly, one urgent, rather than serious, request: Do not now in your early youth, which you are still enjoying, take such a decisive step, an irrevocable one, too rashly! Everything else I leave to your good judgment, your consideration; but this one thing I beg of you! When he heard of my change of heart, he wrote, in a similar vein, that he would consider it indelicate if he should offer to help me, in my inner struggle, with views which originated form entirely different starting-points; that I would fight it out all right by myself.
Life is long, and yours, I hope, will be measured for you as long as for the most favored. Is it, then, necessary to settle all your doubts concerning the most important matter at once? Perhaps you are tormenting yourself too much by meditating incessantly about things which might me put aside for the time being, not that you have declined to make binding decision; then, after your mind has had some rest and recreation, you can return to these problems with a greater calmness, impartiality, and receptiveness.
During vacation I worked on a dissertation [p. I have never published this dissertation, as the non-Euclidian way of thinking to which Felix Klein had introduced me was, after all, a little beyond me. The transition from the seclusion of the convent to the "city of the muses," which in the eighteenth century had produced the "philosophers for the world," and where even now, in spite of the War, sociability flourished, was extremely sudden and staggering. But my youth had enough elasticity to adapt itself, and I soon felt at home in the new milieu.
Lotze's house was always open to me, as well as Baumann's and finally Henle's, at whose musical evenings I played the cello in the quartet. He was a man of the most genial humor and of great kindliness towards his friends. Even shortly before his death I received his charming chatty letters. His "Anthropological Lectures" are known for their keen psychological observations. Weber and Fechner, the former at the home of his brother Wilhelm, where he showed me on my own body various sensory fields, and the latter on a field-trip with Felix Klein.
With Fechner I discussed the difficulties of atomism caused by the unity of consciousness, which he thought to solve by analogy with the unity of the concept.
We also served him as subjects for his experiment with the golden section. The personality of these two great men, genuine scientific investigators, made a lasting impression on me.
My closest friends were Felix Klein and the Scotchman, William Robertson Smith, who as a liberal Bible investigator later on suffered serious persecution in his native country. Klein, who even then felt within him the urge to organize, founded with me the "Eskimo," a society of young scientists, for the purpose of lectures and friendly intercourse, wherein I was to represent the philosophical part.
The club is still alive -- as far as I know -- but with somewhat modified conditions. I began my lectures with ancient philosophy, especially that of Aristotle, whom I studied intensively for a whole year. As my first more serious work, I attempted a critical history of the conception of substance, over which I racked my brain most awfully until I abandoned the problem, and, at Easter,took up the psychological [p. In the relation between color and extension I believed, and still believe, to find a striking example or analogue of the relation which metaphysics assumes to exist among the qualities of a substance.
Thus the new problem was connected with my old work. It progressed rapidly, and, in the fall of the same year, the book was printed. It appeared at a time rather propitious for my advancement, as there were vacancies in philosophy in five universities. It seemed great luck to find a position in a famous university so soon -- especially for the sake of my parents. But there were also certain disadvantages: I had neither enough experience in life nor the necessary scientific maturity for the difficult position.
As Brentano has resigned, and the aged Hoffmann, a follower of Baader, found scarcely any listeners, I had to represent, as it were, the whole Department of Philosophy; but with the courage of youth I gave, in turn, all the great philosophical subjects except ethics. The aftereffects of this over-exertion I was to feel for many a year. Inon a trip through Italy, I met -- besides Bonatelli and Belotti -- the leader of Italian philosophy, that remarkable man, Count Terenzio Mamiani, and his pupil, Luigi Ferri, both of whom asked me casually about the condition of German philosophy.
In the same year I took a trip across the Channel with Smith and had an opportunity to fill out in the British Museum my knowledge of English philosophy, much of which Smith had already brought to my attention in connection with my book on space. Like Brentano, I delighted in this clear, logical -- if not always profound -- philosophizing, and the keen presentation of contrasts that we find in truly classic style in Mills's book on Hamilton.
But Herbert Spencer's constructive manner always seemed tedious to me. The first scholarly work I undertook was a history of the psychology of association, which was connected with my first-mentioned studies, but I gave it up as I had given up that of the conception of substance, and decided to devote myself henceforth to that field which, connecting my musical experiences and studies with the interests of psychology, seemed to me, personally, the most promising.
In I commenced my work on Tonpsychologie. Besides, I frequently spent days in Hanau with the organ builder, Appunn, who had worked for Helmholtz, and we vied with each other in study and observation.
I was well aware, of course, that such absorption in all the details of a field of sensation stood in sharp contrast to the general conception of the mission of the philosopher, although Fechner had been a famous example of this type. Might it not be possible for a specialist in philosophy to work together with other specialists, at least in some particular field?
If this were done by others in other fields, might there not result finally a beneficial relationship between philosophy and the single sciences? My work of observation and experimentation has absorbed my time and strength even more than is the case with most experimental psychologists. Although I fully appreciate the saying of Aristotle that theory is the sweetest of all, I must confess that it was always a joy and a comfort to pass from theory to observation, from meditation to facts, from my writing-desk to the laboratory; and, thus, in the end, my writing-desk was neglected and has not produced a single textbook or compendium, which indeed ought to have been its first duty, even at the time when I was an instructor.
However, I never intended to spend so much of my lifetime on acoustics and musical psychological studies as I did later on. I had counted on a few years. But it was, after all, not musical science but philosophy that always remained mistress of the house, who, it is true, granted most generously great privileges to her helpmate.
In this gay Frankish city, however, one did not live only to work. There was a large circle of friends and plenty of fun, but to talk about such matters would be quite out of place here. Among the older men, Kohlrausch and Wislicenus were my most intimate friends; [p. Music, Beethoven's great wonderful Trio in B Major, had brought us together. Meanwhile, Miss Hermine Biedermann had taken a teaching position in Berlin. She followed the new call, and soon we were united for life.
The great Trio in B Major, however, became our family trio. In I received a call to Prague to succeed Volkmann. The faculty had thought at first of Otto Liebmann, but Brentano, who had been teaching in Vienna sincehad recommended me, without my knowledge, in order to gain in Austria a firmer hold for our theories. This was the case during my first semester.
But, as I in no way concealed my independent attitude toward the Church, the theological students gradually dropped my lectures almost entirely. In the fall of my work in Prague commenced. The intercourse and professional cooperation with this man, remarkable for his keen mind and strength of character, whose studies in the philosophy of language led him deep into thought-psychology, was a great boon to me.
It is, perhaps, not quite wise in assembling a faculty to maintain that the members of the philosophical department should hold different or even opposite views. If the point of view itself is not too one-sided, both students and teachers will gain decidedly by harmonious cooperation of like-minded leaders. I at once worked out systematically and thoroughly a most comprehensive course, including philosophy of law and of the state.